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Online chat platform VRChat says a recent cyberattack compromised the data belonging to nearly 2.5 million users. It confirmed the “data security incident” in a report filed with Maine’s attorney general, but has not disclosed it via public channels. The company’s report confirmed that its cloud environment was accessed between May 10-12, with the unauthorized intruder making off with information concerning 2,436,782 users. This included VRChat usernames, email addresses, whether a user was a VRChat+ subscriber, login histories (including device, hardware identifiers, and IP addresses), and Steam or Meta user IDs. It does not believe passwords, credit cards or other payment information, or government IDs used for age verification were affected. “VRChat sincerely regrets that this security incident occurred,” the company stated in its disclosure. “We understand that trust between our platform and its community is earned through consistent action, and we take full responsibility for the concern this event has caused. “The security and privacy of our players' information remain our highest priority, and we are committed to doing everything within our power to protect it.” VRChat said that after it was made aware of the intrusion, it contained the threat and implemented additional security controls, as well as engaging outside security experts. And in an unusual move for US breaches, the San Francisco-based company did not offer identity theft or credit monitoring services. Offering these kinds of services is not a legal requirement, but doing so is highly common, especially regarding attacks that affect so many individuals. VRChat does not publish the total number of registered users that it has on its books, but its documentation states that “the platform has grown to millions of users,” who have collectively published tens of millions of unique pieces of content for it since its first release in 2014. The part game, part chat platform is an online, open-world chatroom where people walk around interacting with one another via their 3D avatars. It has been compared to Second Life in that users explore other users' worlds, play mini-games, and partake in casual chit-chat, with support for both virtual reality headsets and conventional PCs. You can also think of it as something similar to Meta’s vision for the metaverse, just without all the coworking and KPI meetings, and with way more users. ®

PWNED Welcome, once again, to PWNED, the weekly screed where we highlight those who did not do the deed of securing their systems. If someone left their passwords or their access exposed, we will be writing about them here. Have a story about someone leaving a gaping hole in their network? Share it with us at pwned@sitpub.com. Anonymity is available upon request. This week’s terrifying tale of poor security hygiene comes courtesy of Luke Irwin, CEO and principal consultant at Aegis Cybersecurity. He’s been in the industry for more than a quarter of a century and he knows where the bits are buried. At one point, Irwin consulted for a company that was a large national facility services organization, a 2,000-employee firm that provided cleaning, security guards, industrial abseiling (cleaning the facade), and other things that other large businesses need to keep their physical plants running smoothly. The CEO had one very peculiar idea about how to keep his own house in order: he wanted to have access to every one of his employees’ login credentials. The chief executive had an Excel spreadsheet sitting right on his desktop with a complete list of all the employee usernames and passwords. Let that sink in for a second. One person had all the keys to the castle in a single, easily accessible file. In any decent security setup, no one in the company has access to anyone else’s password. Even the head of the IT department should not know another employee’s password. I say this as someone who used to work for a company where the IT department would ask you to DM them your password if you had computer problems. But this company’s CEO wanted the usernames and passwords for reasons I’m sure any of his employees would appreciate: so he could go into their email accounts! He had an experience where one colleague had sent secret information to the entire company via email and he had spent the evening logging into every single account and deleting the message before anyone could see it. Just in case other messages were sent in error in the future, the CEO wanted the ability to log into all the relevant accounts and delete them himself. Perhaps for the same reason, he would not allow MFA (multi-factor authentication), because that would have kept him out of people’s inboxes. He was adamant even though the company had been the victim of a ransomware incident previously. “Despite repeated advice, he held that position for around four months, until we were able to demonstrate that the IT team could remove messages centrally using fairly simple administrative commands, without needing everyone’s password,” Irwin said. Even after getting rid of the Excel sheet of shame, the boss still refused to turn on MFA and the company subsequently suffered two data breaches involving sensitive client data. Unfortunately, this company wasn’t the only one that Irwin worked with where the management had something against MFA. Another client, this one in the medical sector, was opposed to multi-factor authentication because it “made things just a little too hard” for the external consultants they were using to access their systems. During the time that Irwin worked with that company, they got lucky and no one breached them. But since then, he’s seen signs that their data was available on the dark web. No word on whether they ever switched MFA on. There’s plenty to learn from Irwin’s two clients, but it’s all pretty obvious. First, don’t let anyone, even administrators or CEOs, have other people’s passwords. If someone has to get into another person’s email account, have IT use administrative access. Second, always enable MFA, preferably MFA with passkeys. ®

Multiple reports indicate that Chinese operatives continue using every tech tool at their disposal – including American AI – to amass data on and manipulate everyone from security-clearance holders to everyday US citizens. And they’re trying to influence public opinion on building datacenters for AI, albeit without success so far. One of these reports found a “significant resurgence” of a botnet linked to Chinese government-backed goons, including Volt Typhoon, which previously used a covert network of connected devices to burrow deep into critical US networks and preposition for future destructive attacks. In January 2024, the FBI said it killed Volt’s KV-botnet, comprised of hundreds of end-of-life routers and other internet-connected devices. At the time, KV-botnet consisted of four clusters, with the KV cluster primarily being used as a covert data transfer network, and the JDY cluster used for scanning and reconnaissance. In a Wednesday report, Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs said that while the KV cluster became largely defunct after the law enforcement takedown, the JDY cluster remains an active threat, and has since surged to more than 1,500 compromised routers and IoT devices. “Analysis of this activity shows a clear focus on identifying vulnerable infrastructure shortly after public vulnerability disclosures, suggesting that reconnaissance output is rapidly operationalized by China-nexus advanced persistent threat (APT) actors,” the threat intel team wrote. “This targeted focus has been observed across a range of sectors, with the US military and associated entities as the most prominent.” While the botnet resurgence poses the most pressing threat, and the security shop recommends all enterprises implement CISA and NCSC guidance for mitigating Volt Typhoon activity and defending against China-nexus covert networks of compromised devices, another report indicates that China’s attempts at influence operations haven’t died down, either. Using American AI for covert ops about … American AI OpenAI in a Wednesday report said it banned ChatGPT accounts likely originating from China after they used the American AI company’s models to generate content for covert operations about – wait for it – American AI. While neither of the two clusters seemed to have much success in sowing chaos or swaying opinions, the fact that they tried at all is significant, according to Ben Nimmo, principal investigator on OpenAI’s Intelligence and Investigations team. “Neither campaign appears to have gained much authentic engagement,” Nimmo told reporters. “They're important for what they reveal about the intentions of influence operators from China and the narratives they're testing and seeking to amplify.” The first cluster used ChatGPT to generate social media content and images for an operation claiming datacenters and AI applications are increasing electricity demand and causing higher costs for ordinary Americans. “For example, they asked for comic strips about a power grid operator’s capacity auction prices based on reporting from a legitimate regional paper,” the report says. “They asked ChatGPT to focus the comments on rising capacity prices as a consequence of peak electricity demand, framing the new demand as coming from data centers and AI applications and argued that these costs were ultimately passed to ordinary households.” The operators then posted these comments and images on X, likely using fake accounts, with links to real news stories about datacenters. OpenAI suspects the operators are part of a social-media team at a private Chinese tech company that provides services for Chinese provincial-level government clients. “This was not a case of an influence operation creating a debate,” Nimmo said. “The debate existed already. This was an influence operation from China trying to interfere in it. We didn't see any signs that they succeeded.” The second cluster of banned ChatGPT accounts also likely originated in China and used OpenAI’s models to write comments and draw political cartoons criticizing US tech policies and tariffs. “Interestingly, the operators specified in their prompts that the content should not include cartoons of Xi Jinping in the output and should only include President Trump,” Nimmo said. These accounts, all writing prompts in simplified Chinese and using VPNs to access the AI systems, also used ChatGPT to edit work reports and help design social media monitoring systems. “This isn't the first time that we've seen actors in China trying to come up with ideas for social media monitoring,” Nimmo said. In February, OpenAI said it banned ChatGPT accounts believed to be linked to Chinese government entities attempting to use AI models to surveil individuals and social media accounts. If AI doesn't work, bribery might? If Chinese agents can’t use AI systems to unearth sensitive information, there are always fake websites and job offers promising cash for state secrets. We’ve seen Beijing-linked government snoops use these tactics in the past, and according to the US Justice Department, they’re still using this scam (because it works). On Wednesday, the feds said they obtained a warrant for and seized 13 fake consulting company websites used to target US persons, including current and former security clearance holders with access to classified and sensitive government information. The domains include centrikglobalconsulting.com, rightinfoconsult.com, finnaclevesperconsulting.com, cydfconsulting.com, pulsewaveglobal.com, catalystglobalsolutions.com, thehorizzen.com, geoindopacific.com, gpf-ina.org, safesec-group.com, thetruthinfo.com, Vandercons.com, and gulfpeace.org. Since November 2023, these websites and associated job postings on social media, LinkedIn, and other hiring platforms advertised “consulting” jobs, including “Senior Analyst” and “International Affairs Consultant” positions. Suspected PRC operatives used the sites and job listings to recruit applicants and bribe them for sensitive information, DOJ alleges. “The conspirators have encouraged applicants and recruits to share confidential and sensitive information in violation of their official duties and of particular interest to the People's Republic of China (PRC) government,” according to the court documents. “The recruiters pressured candidates to share confidential information and reports from ‘insider sources' in violation of their official duties.” The court documents allege the conspirators then paid the recruits for these reports using online accounts in the names of fictitious individuals, and cryptocurrency to hide their identities and the source of the payments. ®

They are angry at Redmond and will have their revenge. Nightmare Eclipse, the prolific bug hunter and possibly disgruntled ex-Microsoft employee, disclosed another zero-day vulnerability just hours after Redmond issued a record-breaking number of CVEs and fixes for June Patch Tuesday. The latest zero-day, RoguePlanet, targets Microsoft Defender and works against fully patched Windows 10 and Windows 11 systems, according to the researcher, who also released proof-of-concept exploit code for the security flaw. Assuming the attacker can win a race condition, this bug allows local privilege escalation and leads to SYSTEM-level control over an affected machine. Nightmare Eclipse (aka Chaotic Eclipse) is a disgruntled bug hunter with a deep understanding of Windows and an even deeper grudge against Microsoft. They claim to be an ex-employee, and accuse Redmond of ignoring vulnerability reports and refusing to communicate with them. "When I actively asked you to communicate with me, you refused, humiliated me and made sure to insult me in front of people," they wrote in an earlier blog post that also promised a “bone shattering” drop on July 14. "You defame me in public with your CVE-2026-45585 advisory even though you literally deleted the Microsoft account I used to report bugs to you with and I got zero pennies from doing so and I still happily did like an idiot," the post continued. Possibly as an outlet for this anger, and reportedly in response to Redmond's lack of action, Nightmare began releasing their findings to the public. RoguePlanet marks the seventh Microsoft zero-day that they found and disclosed - accompanied by either a PoC exploit or technical details - before Redmond issued a fix. Microsoft's initial response to those disclosures was widely interpreted as a threat of legal action, prompting massive outrage from the broader infosec community before Redmond sought to calm the backlash by stating it had "no intention to pursue action against individuals conducting or publishing security research." As of Tuesday, the previous six zero-days all have patches. Three of them, RedSun, UnDefend, and BlueHammer, came under attack soon after Nightmare published working exploit code for each and before Microsoft released security updates to address the flaws. The other three, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, and MiniPlasma, all have been fixed as of June’s Patch Tuesday. YellowKey (aka CVE-2026-45585) is a security feature bypass bug in Windows BitLocker. An attacker with physical access to the vulnerable system could bypass the BitLocker Device Encryption feature and gain access to the device's encrypted data. GreenPlasma (aka CVE-2026-45586) and MiniPlasma (aka CVE-2020-17103) are both privilege escalation flaws in the Collaborative Translation Framework (CTFMON) and the Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver that can be abused by an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally and gain SYSTEM access. When asked about RoguePlanet, a Microsoft spokesperson told The Register that the Windows giant is “aware of the reported vulnerability and is actively investigating the validity and potential applicability of these claims." The spokesperson continued: "Microsoft is committed to investigating security issues and updating impacted products to protect customers as soon as possible. Importantly, we support coordinated vulnerability disclosure, an industry standard that protects customers and supports the research community by ensuring their findings are thoroughly investigated and addressed before being made public." Soon after Nightmare published a PoC for RoguePlanet, the ThreatLocker threat intelligence team validated the exploit code and said that they were “actively assessing impact, affected systems, and additional mitigations,” promising to share more findings “as they become available.” Tharros Labs senior vulnerability analyst and long-time respected security sleuth Will Dormann said he tested the exploit code, too. “It's reportedly not 100% reliable, but it worked on the first attempt for me,” Dormann wrote. Nightmare, for their part, rolled back the promise of a “bone shattering” drop on July 14. “(Un)fortunately I will be unable to mass disclose zerodays in July 14th, RoguePlanet took way more time than expected and truly drained me,” the researcher said on Tuesday. “I might take a break but I can't say for sure what I will be doing for next month, maybe it's nothing, maybe it's smtg. But the big thing is not happening. I did not intend to spread a mass panic with that post and I apologize for doing so.”®

GitHub will change npm's defaults so the install command no longer runs scripts automatically, disabling a feature commonly exploited by malicious packages such as the notorious Shai-Hulud worm. Maintainer Leo Balter said: "Install-time lifecycle scripts are the single largest code-execution surface in the npm ecosystem. Every npm install runs scripts from every transitive dependency, so a single compromised package anywhere in your tree can execute arbitrary code on a developer machine or CI (continuous integration) runner." In npm 12, due July, three security-focused defaults are changing. Scripts configured for preinstall, install, or postinstall will no longer run unless explicitly permitted via allow-scripts. The --allow-git flag, which pulls dependencies from remote URLs, will default to off, closing an attack path where a malicious .npmrc file could override the Git executable and achieve arbitrary code execution. Finally, allow-remote will default to none, blocking dependency downloads from remote URLs entirely. It will still be possible to allow scripts to run via an allowlist in the package.json configuration file. This will be pinned to the installed version of a package by default. These are breaking changes, and Balter recommended developers run the commands to allow scripts for every currently installed package in a project that requires them. "This gets you protected against new, unexpected scripts immediately," he said. The next step is to review these packages and deny scripts for those where they are not needed. Some packages require script approval to function, including native modules that compile on install, testing tools like Playwright and Puppeteer (which fetch binaries via postinstall), and Electron, which wraps the Chromium browser engine for cross-platform desktop applications. These features have been available since npm version 11.10.0, released in February, but as opt-in flags rather than defaults. That version also introduced min-release-age, which blocks installation of package version newer than a specified number of days, designed as a safeguard against newly published malicious packages. Best security practice for developers using npm 11.16, the current version, is to set these flags on in .npmrc or via environment variables, which will also prepare a project for the changes in version 12. One annoyance is that the existing flag ignore-scripts does not support an allowlist, other than via an additional tool. The ignore-scripts setting will override allow-scripts, so developers will need to remove it, if set to true, to enable approved scripts to run. The allowScripts setting exists in npm 11 but is advisory only. Will this fix npm security issues? Unfortunately not. "Now all the malware can move from the install script to the module itself where it will inevitably still be run," said one developer. Another common view is that developers should use pnpm, which already has safer defaults than npm, including a minimum release age. There is consensus, though, that these changes do improve npm security and are long overdue. The pull request for this change includes the remark that "npm is the only remaining major package manager that runs dependency install scripts by default. pnpm v10+, Yarn Berry, Bun, and Deno all block them." ®

It's patch time for Ivanti customers again after the security shop disclosed another two critical vulnerabilities in one of its products. Both bugs affect Ivanti Sentry, a mobile gateway that forms part of its broader unified endpoint management platform. The first and worst of the two is CVE-2026-10520 (10.0), a max-severity vulnerability that allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute code with root privileges. Flaws that allow root-level code execution without authentication are about as bad as vulnerabilities get, which explains the perfect-10 rating. The only saving grace is that, by the vendor's reckoning, no one has successfully exploited it in the wild… yet. Public disclosures tend to start a figurative countdown timer when it comes to attackers exploiting bugs, and although Ivanti gave little away about CVE-2026-10520 in its advisory, other researchers have already published breakdowns of the patch, offering clues as to how unpatched systems could still be attacked. According to watchTowr, the vulnerability stemmed from an exposed API running under Apache Tomcat. An attacker could feed the API a specially crafted message, which is parsed as a MICS configuration command and executed by the backend handler with root privileges. It looks like Ivanti fixed this by preventing this attacker-supplied string from being accepted, replacing it with a single, hard-coded command. It also updated the Apache configuration rules to block unauthenticated access to the affected endpoint. The second critical Ivanti Sentry vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-10523, and is scarcely less serious, carrying a near-maximum 9.9 CVSS. The authentication bypass bug allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to create admin accounts, granting themselves top privileges on an affected system. Customers are advised to address both security flaws immediately. They can upgrade to versions 10.5.2, 10.6.2, or 10.7.1. Ivanti's disclosure this week comes after it fixed two separate critical vulnerabilities affecting its Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) in January. The bugs were both handed 9.8 CVSS scores and were exploited as zero-days. Even the Dutch data protection authority reported itself to parliament after attackers breached it as part of the pre-patch exploits. ®

Microsoft set a record with its June Patch Tuesday release, addressing 206 CVEs across its products and shipping fixes for them, with 38 deemed critical and the rest important. Three are listed as publicly known, but none (so far) have been exploited in the wild. We have no idea how many of these June bugs were uncovered using AI tools. Unlike last month’s patching event, when Redmond disclosed its agentic bug-hunting system found 16 of the 137 vulnerabilities, there’s no word on any AI assists for new releases. Still, it’s safe to assume AI played a major role. As Tom Gallagher, VP of engineering at Microsoft Security Response Center, said about May's Patch Tuesday with a whopping 30 critical flaws: “We expect releases to continue trending larger for some time.” June’s Patch Tuesday proved Gallagher correct, surpassing May in both overall volume and critical bugs. “I’ve been counting CVEs on Patch Tuesday since 2017, and this is by far the largest monthly release in that time,” Zero Day Initiative’s bug hunter in chief Dustin Childs said in his review. “It is extraordinary that Microsoft can produce so many patches in a single month, but it does raise concerns,” he added, asking, as we did: How many were found via AI? And: “How many patches were generated using AI to assist in coding or testing? What quality issues may exist in these patches? And likely most importantly, is this the new normal?” Childs noted that May and April also saw mega releases. “Should sysadmins adjust their processes for prioritization and patch deployment based on this new volume of updates? Unfortunately, Microsoft is not providing those answers right now,” he wrote, adding in this fun fact: “The current number of CVEs shipped by Microsoft this year exceeds the total number of CVEs shipped in all of 2018.” Wowza. While it’s fun to watch from a purely speculative standpoint, as in: "Will Microsoft top 300 next month?", our thoughts and prayers are nonetheless with sysadmins and vulnerability management teams drowning in the AI-induced vulnpocalypse by now. None of the Patch Tuesday security holes are listed as under attack – at least not yet – but three are listed as publicly known. Let’s take a look at those first. Three known vulnerabilities CVE-2026-49160 is an HTTP.sys denial of service vulnerability that we wrote about earlier this month. Calif researcher Quang Luong discovered the attack with an assist from OpenAI's Codex agent, named it HTTP/2 Bomb, and said it exploits the HTTP/2 header compression algorithm by sending thousands of tiny messages to the server, forcing it to rapidly allocate memory and ultimately crash. At the time, a Microsoft spokesperson told The Register that Redmond was “aware and actively investigating appropriate mitigations.” On Tuesday, the tech giant fixed the security issue by introducing a new MaxHeadersCount registry setting, which allows users to limit the number of headers included in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests, and should prevent denial-of-service attacks. CVE-2026-50507, a security feature bypass bug in Windows BitLocker, is the second CVE listed as publicly disclosed, and “exploitation more likely.” An attacker with physical access to the vulnerable system could bypass the BitLocker Device Encryption feature and gain access to the device's encrypted data, according to the advisory. This flaw also seems to be a patch for one of the zero-days dropped in the ongoing war between Microsoft and a disgruntled bug hunter known as Nightmare Eclipse - likely the YellowKey vulnerability disclosed in May. Nightmare has published details about and in some cases, full proof-of-concept exploit code for six zero-days, and promised a “bone shattering” release on June 14. The third publicly known bug, CVE-2026-45586, is a Windows Collaborative Translation Framework (CTFMON) elevation of privilege vulnerability that can be abused by an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally and gain SYSTEM access. From there, miscreants could deploy malware, steal data, and move laterally through the victim's environment - so patch this one sooner. Plus these two (of 38) critical bugs In addition to those three known vulnerabilities that made the rounds before Microsoft issued a patch, a couple of critical-rated 9.8 security flaws are worth highlighting this month. The first, CVE-2026-45657, is a Windows kernel remote code execution (RCE) bug that allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to run code with system-level privileges without any user interaction. It’s due to an error in how the Windows kernel processes some TCP/IP data, and can be exploited by sending malicious network packets to a vulnerable Windows system, thus triggering the flaw. While it’s listed as “exploitation less likely” by Redmond, we like Childs’ response. “Rest assured that every researcher and bug shop on the planet is reversing this patch right now trying to create an exploit,” he said. “Test and deploy this patch quickly.” CVE-2026-47291, an HTTP.sys RCE vulnerability that also earned a 9.8 CVSS rating, deserves attention as it can also be triggered with zero user interaction and Microsoft says it’s “more likely” to be exploited. “This vulnerability creates severe business risk because HTTP.sys is used by Windows services that process HTTP traffic,” Alex Vovk, CEO and co-founder of patch-management vendor Action1, told The Register. “A successful attack could lead to server takeover, malware deployment, data theft, service disruption, and lateral movement across the environment. Internet-facing systems are especially exposed.” The good news: systems using the Windows HTTP stack’s default MaxRequestBytes registry value are not affected. In the advisory, Redmond provides detailed instructions on how to edit registry settings, which can buy admins some time (and security) while deploying the patch. ®